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Abstract
We consider the decoding problem or the problem of finding low weight
codewords for rank metric codes. We show how additional information
about the codeword we want to find under the form of certain linear
combinations of the entries of the codeword leads to algorithms with a
better complexity. This is then used together with a folding technique for
attacking a McEliece scheme based on LRPC codes. It leads to a feasible
attack on one of the parameters suggested in [11].
1 Introduction
McEliece schemes. The hardness of the problem of decoding a linear code
makes its use very attractive in the cryptographic setting. Indeed it has been
proven to be NP-complete for the Hamming metric in the seminal paper of
Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg [2]. Moreover, despite some significant
research efforts, only exponential algorithms are known for it and the exponent
has decreased only very slowly over time [1]. One of the very first public-key
cryptosystem [19] is actually (partly) based on this problem. It still belongs to
the very few public key cryptosystems which remain unbroken today.
One of the drawbacks of this scheme is its large public key size. It relies on
a particular code family, namely Goppa codes, which in many respects look like
random linear codes but still have an efficient decoding algorithm. Since then,
many approaches have been tried to reduce the key size: (i) alternative code
families have been proposed, (ii) using codes with a large automorphism group
such as quasi-cyclic codes, (iii) changing the metric used for the code and the
code itself.
McEliece schemes based on rank metric codes. In this paper we focus on a
proposal which is a mixture of the approaches (ii) and (iii): the LRPC scheme
of [11]. It relies on a new family of codes, called Low Rank Parity Check
(LRPC in short) codes which are devised for the rank metric. The first McEliece
scheme based on rank metric codes was the Gabidulin-Paramonov-Tretjakov
cryptosystem [9]. It relies on an analogue of Reed-Solomon codes for the rank
metric, the “Gabidulin codes”. The scheme got broken by Overbeck in [22]. One
of the main reasons for its insecurity can be traced back to its rich algebraic
structure. This is not the case for the LRPC scheme. For this family of codes,
like for the MDPC codes based McEliece scheme of [20], it seems that key
security and message security really rely on the same problem, namely finding
a low rank weight (or moderate Hamming weight for [20]) codeword in a linear
code with no structure.
Decoding for the rank metric. It is essential with this approach to have
a good assessment of the complexity of solving the decoding problem in the
rank metric. Recall that in Delsarte’s language [5], linear rank metric codes are
viewed as the subspace generated by a set of matrices of a same size over some
finite field Fq.
The associated decoding problem is also known under the name "MinRank"
and is known to be NP-complete [3]. Generally such codes arise in the form of
linear codes defined over some extension field Fqm .
This problem has attracted some attention in the cryptographic community
and algorithms of exponential complexity have been devised for it [4, 21, 12, 14,
6].
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Attacks on quasi-cyclic codes by folding the code. The parameters of the
LRPC scheme have been devised in order to be safe against the aforementioned
algorithms for decoding in the rank metric. However, the authors of the scheme
have also used quasi-cyclic versions of such codes in order to reduce further the
size of the parameters. It has been found out recently [7, 8] that McEliece ver-
sions based on quasi-cylic or quasi-monoidic codes can be attacked by reducing
the size of the code by adding coordinates which belong to the same orbit of
the automorphism group. This is called the “folding” process in these papers.
When this process is applied to quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic alternant or Goppa
codes suggested in the cryptographic community, this results in a much smaller
alternant or Goppa code and this can be used to mount a key recovery attack.
This approach was further investigated and the folding process was generalized
by using a polynomial formalism in [17]. It was shown there that this approach
can be used for the quasi-cyclic LRPC codes of [11] and gives a LRPC code of
much smaller size but which still has in its dual low weight codewords. The
decoding algorithm of [12] can then be used to find these low weight codewords
in a more efficient way than for the original code. This results in a multiplica-
tive gain in the complexity of the attack of order 212 for one of the parameters
proposed in [11].
Our contribution. Our contribution in the paper is threefold. First we show
how certain rank decoding algorithms of [21, 12] may benefit from some partial
knowledge on the codeword which is sought. We consider here that we are given
certain linear combinations of the entries of the codeword. This generalizes the
Fqm linear case where a certain entry can be assumed to be equal to 1. Roughly
speaking, when we search in the latter case for a rank weight w codeword using
the algorithm of [21, 12] we have algorithms of complexity q(w−1)α where α
is some quantity that depends on the algorithm which is considered and some
code parameters. We show how the complexity of these algorithms can be
reduced to q(w−a)α when we know a independent linear combinations of the code
positions. We also obtain by the approach of [12] applied to the transposed code
an algorithm with the same complexity as [21] but which is significantly simpler.
Finally, we show that when the folding process is applied to the quasi-cyclic Fqm
linear codes considered in [11] we know two independent linear combinations of
the codeword we are looking for, instead of just one. This is then used together
with the generalized folding process of [17] to give a much more efficient attack
than in [17].
2 Generalities about rank metric codes
Let us start with the definition of a matrix code
Definition 2.1 (Matrix code). A matrix code of size m× n over Fq is a linear
code generated by matrices of size m×n over Fq. When the code is of dimension
K we say that it is an [m× n,K] matrix code over Fq.
Remark 2.2. It will be convenient to express K under the form K = k.m.
Notice that k is not necessarily an integer.
It might be thought that this is nothing but a linear code of length m.n.
The point of this definition is that we equip such codes with the rank metric
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that is defined by d(A,B) = Rank(A−B). The weight |c| of a word c is taken
with respect to the rank, that is |c|
def
= d(c, 0) = Rank(c). Generally such codes
are obtained from Fqm linear codes as follows
Definition 2.3 (Matrix code associated to an Fqm linear code). Let C be an
[n, k] linear code over Fqm and let (β1 . . . βm) be a basis of Fqm over Fq. Each
word c ∈ C can be represented by an m × n matrix M (c) = (Mij)1≤i≤m
1≤j≤n
over
Fq, with cj =
∑m
i=1Mijβi. The set {M(c), c ∈ C} is the matrix code associated
to the Fqm linear code C. It is of type [m× n, k.m].
This definition depends of course of the basis chosen for Fqm . However
changing the basis does not change the distance between codewords. The point
of defining matrix codes in this way is that they have a more compact descrip-
tion. It is readily seen that an [m× n, k.m] matrix code can be specified from
a systematic generator matrix by k(n − k)m2 log2 q bits whereas a Fqm-linear
code uses only k(n − k) log2 q
m = k(n − k)m log2 q bits. This is particularly
interesting for cryptographic applications where this notion is directly related
to the public key size. We can now define the two central problem in this field,
namely
Problem 2.1 (Decoding in the rank metric). For a given matrix code C of type
[m × n,K] over Fq, a matrix A in F
m×n
q and an integer w, find a codeword c
in C such that Rank(A− c) = w.
Problem 2.2 (Low rank codeword problem). For a given matrix code C and
an integer w, find a codeword c of rank weight w in C.
The decoding problem reduces to the low rank codeword problem by finding
a codeword of weight w in the matrix code C′ where C′ is generated by the
codewords of C and A when C does not contain codewords of rank weight w.
In other words, decoding an error of weight w in an [m × n,K] matrix code
reduces to the problem of finding a codeword of weight w in an [m× n,K + 1]
matrix code. Notice that the low rank codeword problem is slightly simpler for
matrix codes obtained from Fqm linear codes. Indeed, we may assume that the
codeword c of weight w contains a coordinate equal to 1. This follows from the
fact that multiplying c by any nonzero element of Fqm does not change the rank
of the associated matrix. In other words, we have some additional knowledge
about the codeword (or the error) of weight w in this case. Notice that the
support trapping decoding algorithm (see next section) of [12] and the decoding
algorithm of [21] given for Fqm both exploit this knowledge. They have an
asymptotic exponential complexity of the form qα(w−1) whereas it would have
been only qαw for an unstructured matrix code with the same parameters.
3 A support trapping decoding algorithm
[12] has introduced a very neat and simple algorithm for decoding in the rank
metric. It can be considered as a support trapping decoding algorithm for an
[m× n, k.m] matrix code that tries to guess a subspace F of the column space
F
m
q of m× n matrices over Fq that contains the column space E of the error e
we want to find. Since we focus on the low-weight finding problem in this article
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we will explain this algorithm in the case we look for a codeword of weight w
in an [m × n,K] code. In this case, E is the column space of c. The next
step is then to express the columns ci of c in a basis f1, . . . ,fr of F , that is
ci =
∑r
j=1 xijf j . This gives n.r unknowns (the xij ’s). From a parity-check
matrix of the matrix code we deduce n.m−k.m = (n−k)m equations involving
the entries of c that can all be expressed in terms of the xij ’s. In other words,
we have a linear system with (n−k)m equations and n.r unknowns. We choose
r to be the least integer such that the number of unknowns is less than the
number of equations. In our case, r = m−
⌈
km
n
⌉
.
The complexity of the algorithm depends on the probability of having E ⊂ F .
It is equal to the number of subspaces of dimension w in a subspace of dimension
r, divided by the number of all subspaces of dimension w in Fmq . This probability
can be easily expressed with Gaussian coefficients, which counts the number of
subspaces of a vector-space :
p =
[
r
w
]
q[
m
w
]
q
= Θ
(
q−w(m−r)
)
(1)
We use here the following notation.
Notation 3.1.
[
m
w
]
q
is the Gaussian binomial coefficient that is equal to the
number of subspaces of Fmq of dimension w. Recall that this coefficient satisfies[
m
w
]
q
= Θ
(
qw(m−w)
)
.
The cost to solve a linear system of (n−k)m unknown by Gaussian elimina-
tion is O
(
(n−k)3m3
)
. Thus, the overall expected complexity for this algorithm
is O
(
(n− k)3m3qw⌈
km
n
⌉
)
.
As explained in [12] F can be viewed as the support of a codeword for the
rank metric. What makes this notion interesting is that it establishes a parallel
with the Hamming metric : indeed, if we know the support c of a codeword c
we can recover c in polynomial time by solving a linear system.
This algorithm is much more efficient than the algorithm in [21] whenm ≤ n.
Let us notice that in the case m > n we can improve this algorithm in a simple
way by using the notion of the transposed code which is defined as follows [10]
Definition 3.2 (transposed code). The transposed of an [m×n,K] matrix code
C over Fq is a [n×m,K] matrix code C
T over Fq obtained by C
T = {MT ,M ∈
C}.
The idea underlying the definition of such a code is that transposing a ma-
trix preserves its rank, therefore finding the minimum rank weight (nonzero)
codeword C can be obtained from the transpose of the minimum rank weight
(nonzero) codeword of CT . Notice that taking the transpose basically swaps the
role of n and m. This notion can be used when m ≥ n for finding a codeword
of weight w in a matrix code C by looking for a codeword of weight w in CT . It
is readily seen that this leads to an
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algorithm of complexityO
(
(n−k)3m3qw⌈k⌉
)
for finding a codeword of weight
w. This is precisely the complexity that the algorithm of [21] would give for find-
ing a codeword of weight w in a matrix code. However the algorithm presented
here is much simpler than the algorithm of [21].
4 A low weight codeword finding algorithm using
additional knowledge on the codeword
In this section, we assume that we have additional knowledge about the code-
word of weight w we want to find in the form of linear combinations of its
columns. More precisely we are looking for an algorithm whose input and out-
put are specified in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Low rank codeword finding with additional information
Input :
(i) an [m× n, k.m] matrix code C over Fq that has at least one codeword
c = (cij)1≤i≤m
1≤j≤n
of rank weight w
(ii) a elements c′1, . . . , c
′
a in F
m
q that are linear combinations of columns
of c.
(iii) the coefficients λij ’s of these linear combinations, that is if we denote
by c.,j = (cij)1≤i≤m the j-th column of c, then c
′
i =
∑n
j=1 λijc.,j for
i ∈ {1, . . . , a}.
Assumes: c′1, . . . , c
′
a are linearly independent.
Output : a codeword of C of rank weight w.
The case of a matrix code obtained from an Fqm -linear code is a particular
case of such an additional knowledge: as explained before we can assume that
one of the columns of the codeword we are looking for is the column (10 . . .0)T .
The folding attack that we present in Section 5 will provide another example
where we have the knowledge of two independent linear combinations of the
columns and will use in an essential way the algorithm we give here.
4.1 The case n ≥ m
We use here a variation of the support trapping algorithm [12]. The case when
a = 1 and when the matrix code is obtained from an Fqm-linear code is already
treated in [12, Prop. 3.1]. Generalizing this argument to the more general
setting considered here just consists in chosing in the error trapping algorithm
recalled in Section 3 an F as a random subspace of dimension r that contains
the subspace generated by the a elements c′1, . . . , c
′
a. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The support trapping algorithm outlined above has expected
complexity O
(
(n− k)3m3q(w−a)⌈
km
n
⌉
)
when applied on a matrix code over Fq of
type [m× n, k.m].
The complexity given follows almost immediately from the following propo-
sition.
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Proposition 4.2. Let E be a subspace of dimension w of Fmq and let E
′ be a
subspace of E of dimension a. Let S be the set of subspaces of dimension r of
F
m
q that contain E
′ and let F be an element of S chosen uniformly at random.
We have
Prob (E ⊂ F ) =
[
r − a
w − a
]
q[
m− a
w − a
]
q
= Θ
(
q(w−a)(m−r)
)
.
Proof. Let V = Fmq /E
′ ≃ Fm−aq .
Let π be the canonical surjection from Fmq to V :
π : Fmq → V
x 7→ x+ E′
It is well known that π gives a one-to-one correspondence between the subspaces
of Fmq which contain E
′ and the subspaces of V .
Lemma 4.3. Let F be a subspace of dimension r of Fmq that contains E
′. The
dimension of π(F ) is r − a.
Proof. Let (e1, . . . , ea) be a basis of E
′. We can complete this basis into a basis
(e1, . . . , ea,f1, . . . ,fr−a) of F . It is obvious that (π(f1), . . . , π(f r−a)) is a basis
of π(F ), so dimπ(F ) = r − a
By using this lemma, we finish the proof of Proposition 4.2. There are[
m− a
w − a
]
q
subspaces of V of dimension w − a . This implies that there exist[
m− a
w − a
]
q
subspaces of dimension w of Fmq that contain E
′.
Let F be a subspace of dimension r of Fmq that contains E
′. According to
the previous lemma, dimπ(F ) = r − a. So π(F ) contains
[
r − a
w − a
]
q
subspaces
of dimension w − a. From this, we deduce that F contains
[
r − a
w − a
]
q
subspaces
of dimension w that contain E′. Hence
Prob (E ⊂ F ) =
[
r − a
w − a
]
q[
m− a
w − a
]
q
= Θ
(
q−(w−a)(m−r)
)
The proof of Proposition 4.1 follows directly from this Proposition. Indeed
we choose in the support trapping algorithm, E′ to be the linear space generated
by c′1, . . . , c
′
a and F as a random subspace of F
m
q that contains E
′. The expected
complexity of the support trapping algorithm is now given by the inverse of the
probability that we computed in Proposition 4.1 multiplied by the complexity
of solving a linear system with (n− k)m equations.
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4.2 The case m > n
This will be treated essentially by a variation on the error trapping algorithm
applied to the transposed code which uses in a suitable way the additional
knowledge about the codeword we want to find. The technical difficulty we face
here can be described as follows. If we had additional knowledge about c in the
form of a independent elements belonging to the row space of c, then we could
immediately apply the algorithm given in Section 3 to the transposed code.
However it turns out that in the case we are interested in, the knowledge about
c that we have concerns the column space of c. In this case, when we transpose
c to reverse the role of n and m, this translates into some knowledge of the
row space of cT and we can not use the algorithm of Section 3 anymore. This
is why we are going to consider a slightly more complicated algorithm which
is able to use some knowledge on the column space of c. It will be essential
for our attack that is given in Section 5 to work to have an efficient algorithm
for finding low-rank codewords by exploiting some knowledge about the low-
rank codeword we are looking for. Even if the underlying code is defined for
m < n it turns out that we are reducing this problem to another low-rank
finding problem in a new code where m > n. Of course we could still use
the algorithm described in Section 3. It appears that the Ourivski-Johansson
[21] is better in the regime when n < m. However, this algorithm in its [21]
form is unable to take full advantage of the knowledge we have about the low-
weight codeword we are looking for. It would have been possible to give a
version of the Ourivski-Johansson that exploits additional knowledge in the same
way we generalized slightly the support trapping algorithm of [12]. However,
the Ourivski-Johannson algorithm is rather involved and we will use another
approach here that recovers the same work factor as the Ourivski-Johannsson
algorithm in the case of decoding a Fqm-linear code but in a much simpler
fashion. This new decoding algorithm is in essence a support trapping algorithm
working on the transposed code. It will also be able to use in a simple way
additional knowledge about the low rank word we are looking for.
The point is now that by applying a version of the support trapping al-
gorithm of [12] that makes use in a suitable way of the additional knowl-
edge we have about the support, we basically recover an algorithm with the
same complexity as the Ourivski-Johansson algorithm for decoding Fqm linear
codes. More generally it will have an exponential asymptotic complexity of or-
der O
(
(n − k)3m3q(w−a)k
)
for an [m × n, k.m] matrix code over Fq when we
know a independent linear combinations of the columns of the matrix codeword
of rank w we are looking for.
This algorithm can be described as follows
Step 1 (transformation of the code): We first transform the matrix code C
by multiplying it at the right by an n× n invertible matrix P such that c gets
transformed in a matrix c′ whose i first columns are precisely the c′i’s defined
before. In other words, we consider the code C′ = CP . If c is a word of rank
weight w then c′ is still a word of rank weight w. Moreover by assumption on
the independence of the c′i’s for i ∈ {1, . . . , a} we can further multiply C
′ on the
left by an m×m invertible matrix Q such that c′ gets transformed in a matrix
c” whose first a columns are the first a elements e1, . . . , ea of the canonical basis
of Fmq , that is ei has only zero entries with the exception of the i-th entry which
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is equal to 1. Let C” be the resulting code obtained by these operations, that is
C” = QCP
Notice that c” has still rank w.
Step 2: (setting up the unknowns of the linear system) We are now
basically going to apply a variation of the support trapping algorithm of [12]
on C”T by choosing a subspace V of Fnq of dimension r (r will be specified later
on) for which we hope that it contains the subspace generated by the columns
of c”T . A basis v1, . . . ,vr of this space is chosen such that
vj,i = 0 for i, j in {1, . . . , a} and i 6= j (2)
vi,i = 1 for i in {1, . . . , a} (3)
vj,i = 0 for i in {a+ 1, . . . , r} and j in {1, . . . , a} (4)
where vj,i denotes the j-th coordinate of vi. The entries vj,i are chosen uniformly
at random for i in {a + 1, . . . , r} and j in {a + 1, . . . , n}. The entries of vj,i
for i in {1, . . . , a} and j in {a+ 1, . . . , n} will be chosen afterwards. Denote by
C1, . . . ,Cm the m columns of c”
T . Let us introduce the xs,t’s in Fq that are
such that
Cs =
r∑
t=1
xs,tvt for s in {1, . . . ,m}. (5)
Notice now the following point
Lemma 4.4. For s > a and all i in {1, . . . , a} we have xs,i = 0. If we denote
by Ci,j the i’th element of the j-th column Cj of c”
T then Ci,j = 0 for all i, j
in {1, . . . , a} with the exception of the diagonal elements Ci,i that are equal to
1.
Proof. Denote by R1, . . . ,Rn the n rows of c”
T . Notice that
Ri = ei, for i in {1, . . . , a} (6)
where the ei’s are as before the canonical basis of F
m
q . This implies directly that
Ci,j = 0 for all i, j in {1, . . . , a} with the exception of the diagonal elements Ci,i
that are equal to 1. Moreover, by using (6) together with (2),(3) and (4) we
know that xs,i = 0 for s > a and all i in {1, . . . , a}.
This motivates to define as unknowns the (m−a)(r−a)+a(n−a) quantities
xs,t and Ci,j for s in {a+ 1, . . . ,m}, t in {a+ 1, . . . , r}, i in {a+ 1, . . . , n} and
j in {1, . . . , a}.
Moreover these unknowns satisfy nm − km = (n − k)m linear equations
obtained from the fact c”T belongs to C”T which is a matrix code of dimension
km. They can be obtained by computing a parity-check matrix of this code,
then expressing the linear equations that the entries of c”T have to satisfy and
then replacing these entries by the aforementioned unknowns by using (5) and
Lemma 4.4. We choose r such that the number of equations, that is (n − k)m
is at least equal to the number of unknowns, that is
(n− k)m ≥ (m− a)(r − a) + a(n− a)
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This can be obtained by choosing
r
def
=
⌊
m
m− a
(n− k) + a
m− n
m− a
⌋
Step 3: (solving the linear system) The last point just consists in solving
the linear system, this yields c”T and from this we deduce c” and then c by
c = Q−1c”P−1
The last point to understand is under which condition V contains the sub-
space generated by the columns of c”T . This depends on how we specify the
entries vj,i for i in {1, . . . , a} and j in {a+1, . . . , n}. We choose them such that
(5) is verified for s in {1, . . . , a}. This can obviously be done by choosing
vi = Ci for i ∈ {1, . . . , a} (7)
Lemma 4.5. Let V be chosen by a basis v1, . . . ,vr such that its a first elements
are given by (7) and as specified in Step 2 for the other elements. Let W be the
subspace generated by the columns of c”T . Let W0 be the subspace of W that
is formed by the elements whose first a entries are all equal to 0. In the same
way, we denote by V0 the subspace that is formed by the elements of V whose
first a entries are all equal to 0. We have W ⊂ V iff W0 ⊂ V0.
Proof. It is clear that W ⊂ V implies W0 ⊂ V0.
Now assume that W0 ⊂ V0. Notice that W is generated by W0 and by the
first a columns of c”, that is C1, . . . ,Ca. Since V is generated by the same first
a columns of c”, C1, . . . ,Ca and by V0 we have that W ⊂ V .
Putting all these considerations together we obtain that
Theorem 4.6. Let C be an [m × n, k.m] matrix code which has at least one
codeword of rank weight w for which we know a independent linear combina-
tions of its columns as specified in Algorithm 1. Assume that n ≤ m and let
r
def
=
⌊
m
m−a (n− k) + a
m−n
m−a
⌋
. Then the algorithm given in this section outputs
a codeword of weight w with complexity O
(
(n− k)3m3q(w−a)(n−r)
)
.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 4.5 and Proposition 4.2 that show
that we will try an expected number of
[
n− a
w − a
]
q[
r − a
w − a
]
q
= Θ
(
q(w−a)(n−r)
)
spaces V
before finding the right one if there is only one codeword c which has the right
form. This is of course an upper bound if there are more than one codeword that
have the right form. Each try of a tentative space V takes time O
(
(n− k)3m3
)
whose complexity is dominated by Step 3 when we solve a linear system with
(n− k)m equations and a number of unknowns that is less than the number of
equations.
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5 Folding and projecting attack
In this section we present a key recovery attack on the LRPC cryptosystem [11].
The codes used there are defined by
Definition 5.1 (LRPC code). Let C be the matrix code associated to the Fqm -
linear code with a full rank parity check matrix H of size (n− k)×n. It defines
an [n, k] LRPC of weight d if the Fq subspace of Fqm generated by the entries
of H is of dimension d.
A probabilistic decoding algorithm of polynomial time for LRPC codes is
presented in [11]. This algorithm uses in an essential way that such a code has
a parity-check matrix H that has entries in a subspace of small dimension. H
can be easily hidden by giving a systematic parity-check matrix Hsyst. This
family of codes can then be used in a McEliece type scheme [19] : the secret key
is H and the public key is Hsyst. To recover the secret key, the attacker must
find a word of weight d in the dual of C, which is hard in principle. To decrease
the key sizes, double-circulant LRPC codes are suggested in [11].
Definition 5.2. A double-circulant LRPC (DC-LRPC) code of weight d over
Fqm is an LRPC code defined from a double-circulant parity check matrix H =(
H1 H2
)
where H1 and H2 are two circulant matrices and the Fq-subspace
of Fqm generated by the entries of H is of dimension d.
5.1 Folded and projected codes
We present here two new ingredients of the attacks that follow, namely the
notion of folded code and the notion of projected code. The first attack uses
only folding but the second attack uses both. The notion of projected codes uses
the polynomial framework for dealing with quasi-cyclic codes [16, 15]. Quasi-
cyclic codes are a generalization of double-circulant codes : they are defined
by a parity check matrix formed only from circulant blocks. Such a quasi-
cyclic code of length N = ℓn defined over a finite field K, where the size of the
circulant blocks is n, can also be viewed as code over the ring K[X ]/(Xn − 1).
This is a specific instance of cellular codes that are codes defined over a ring
R = K[X ]/(f(X)) where f(X) is a polynomial of K[X ].
For the reader’s convenience, we recall here the polynomial formalism of
[18, 15] and follow the presentation given in [17]. Recall that the fact that
quasi-cyclic codes can be viewed as codes defined over the ring K[X ]/(f(x))
follows directly from
Proposition 5.3. The set of circulant matrices of size n× n over Fqm is iso-
morphic to the Fqm -algebra Fqm [X ]/(X
n − 1) by the function φ
φ
(
n−1∑
i=0
aiX
i
)
=


a0 a1 . . . an−1
an−1 a0 . . . an−2
. . .
. . .
a1 a2 . . . a0


More generally we consider codes over a finite field K derived from codes
defined over a ring
R
def
= K[X ]/(f(X))
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where f is some polynomial in K[X ] of degree n. They are derived from the
following K-isomorphism ψ : R → Kn :
a(X) =
n−1∑
i=0
aiX
i 7→ ψ(a(X)) = (a0, . . . , an−1).
They are called cellular codes and are defined by
Definition 5.4 (cellular code). Consider a submodule M of Rℓ of rank s. Let
ψℓ : Rℓ → Kℓn that maps an element (f1, . . . , fl) of R
ℓ to Kℓn by mapping each
fi to ψ(fi). The cellular code associated to M is given by ψ
ℓ(M). It is said to
have index ℓ and it is a K-linear code of length ℓn.
Remark 5.5. In order to avoid cumbersome notation, we identified M with
ψℓ(M) in Section 5. Sometimes it will better to view the cellular code ψℓ(M)
as M and we will freely do this.
To obtain a generator matrix of the cellular code from a generator matrix
GM =


a1,1(X) . . . a1,ℓ(X)
...
. . .
...
as,1(X) . . . as,ℓ(X)


of the rank s-submodule we introduce the following mapping φ : R→ Kn×n:
a(X) =
n−1∑
i=0
aiX
i 7→ φ(a(X)) =


ψ(a(X))
ψ(Xa(X))
...
ψ(Xn−1a(X))


It is a bijective morphism of K-algebras. When f(X) = Xn − 1 this is pre-
cisely the mapping that appears in Proposition 5.3. A generator matrix of the
associated cellular code is now given by
G =


A1,1 . . . A1,ℓ
...
. . .
...
As,1 . . . As,ℓ


where Ai,j = φ(ai,j(X)). This implies that the dimension k of the cellular code
satisfies k ≤ ns.
Definition 5.6 (projected code). Consider a cellular code C of index ℓ defined
over R
def
= K[X ]/(f(X)) and let g(X) be a divisor of f(X) in K[X ]. The pro-
jected cellular code C
g
is obtained by viewing a codeword c of C as an element of
Rl : c = (c1, . . . , cℓ) and applying the surjective morphism Π from K[X ]/(f(X))
to K[X ]/(g(X)) defined by Π(a(X)) = a(X) (mod g(X)) to every entry ci.
In the particular case where f(X) = Xn − 1 and g(X) = Xm − 1 where m
is a divisor of n, projecting corresponds to folding in the sense of [7, 8].
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Definition 5.7 (folded code). Consider a quasi-cyclic code C of index ℓ and
length nℓ. Let m be a divisor of n. Its folded code of order m is a quasi-
cyclic code of index ℓ and length mℓ obtained by mapping each codeword c =
(c0, . . . , cnℓ−1) of C to the codeword c
′ = (c′0, . . . , c
′
mℓ−1) where
c′i =
n
m
−1∑
s=0
can+b+sm
and a and b are the quotient and the remainder of the euclidean division of i by
m:
i = am+ b with a and b integer and b ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
This really amounts to sum the coordinates that belong to the same orbit
of a (permutation) autorphism of order n/m that leaves the quasi-cyclic code
invariant.
There are two points which make these two notions very interesting in the
cryptographic setting. The first point is that these two reductions of the code
do not lead to a trivial code at the end (one could have feared to end up with the
full space after projecting or folding). This comes from the following proposition
that is proved in [17, Corollary 1]
Proposition 5.8. Consider a cellular code C of index ℓ defined over R
def
=
K[X ]/(f(X)) and let g(X) be a divisor of f(X) in K[X ]. The length of the
projected code C
g
is ℓ deg g whereas the dimension of C
g
is less than or equal to
sℓ where s is the rank of the cellular code.
The second point is that this operation of folding behaves nicely with respect
to projecting a quasi-cyclic code defined over an extension field Fqm with respect
to the rank distance over Fq when the divisor g belongs to Fq[X ]
Proposition 5.9 ([17, Prop.3]). Consider a cellular code C of index ℓ defined
over R
def
= Fqm [X ]/(f(X)) and let g(X) be a divisor of f(X) in Fq(X). Denote
by Π the associated projection operation. We have
Rank(Π(c)) ≤ Rank(c)
for any c ∈ C where we view these codewords as matrices in Fm×ℓdeg fq or in
F
m×ℓ deg g
q by taking the matrix form of these codewords as defined in Section 2.
Notice that this proposition can always be applied to folded codes. These
two propositions allow to search for a codeword c of rank w in a quasi-cyclic
code C of index ℓ and length nℓ defined over Fqm by projecting it with respect
to a divisor of Xn− 1 that belongs to Fq[X ] (or by folding it) and looking for a
word of rank ≤ w in the projected or folded code. Roughly speaking, the first
proposition ensures that we are not looking for a word w in the entire space.
From the second proposition, we expect that as long w is below the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound of the folded code, the codeword of weight ≤ w we will find
in the projected code corresponds to the projection of c. This allows to recover
easily c.
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5.2 A first attack based on folding
Let C be a DC-LRPC [2k, k] code of weight d over Fqm obtained from a parity-
check matrix H . To recover H it is clearly sufficient to find a codeword of rank
weight d in the dual C⊥ of C. Let C′ be the folding of order 1 of C⊥.
It is in general a [2, 1] code. This folding reveals some additional information
about the subspace F of Fqm generated by the coefficients of H . We namely
have
Proposition 5.10. Let c′ = (c′1, c
′
2) be in C
′. There exists c of weight d in C⊥
such that the Fq-subspace generated by the coordinates of c contains c
′
1 and c
′
2.
Proof. If C′ is the all-zero code or c′ = 0 the conclusion follows directly.
Assume now that this is not the case. In this case, C′ is of dimension 1.
Consider a codeword c of C⊥ which is of weight d. Let c” be the folded version
of c. We have in this case c′ = αc” for some α ∈ F⋆qm . Note that c
′ is the folded
version of αc. We observe now two things and this finishes the proof
• d = Rank(c) = Rank(αc) where we view these codewords as matrices in
F
m×n
q as explained in Section 2.
• c′1 and c
′
2 are in the Fq-subspace of Fqm generated by the coordinates of
αc.
We can use (c′1, c
′
2) in the decoding algorithm described in Section 4. From
c we recover immediately a parity-check matrix of the form βH , where β ∈
Fqm\{0}, by building a parity-check matrix from c and its cyclic shifts. This
gives an attack of complexity O
(
k3m3q(d−2)⌈
m
2
⌉
)
. However for the parameters
proposed in [11, 13], this does not improve the attacks already considered there.
However, this proposition together with another projection of the code will lead
to a feasible attack against a certain parameter of [11, 13] as we now show.
5.3 An improved attack based on folding and projecting
To improve the attack, we search for a word of weight d in a projected code.
This new attack depends on the factorization of Xk − 1. The length of the
projected code we are interested in will be smaller than m and we will use the
algorithm of Subsection 4.2 instead. The attack can be described as
Step 1: Compute C′ the folding of order 1 of C⊥ and extract a codeword (c′1, c
′
2)
in it.
Step 2: Compute the projected code C⊥
D
with respect to a certain divisor
D(X) of Xk − 1 in Fq[X ].
Step 3: Find a codeword c” in C⊥
D
of weight w such that the Fq space gener-
ated by its coordinates contains c′1 and c
′
2 by using the algorithm of Subsection
4.2.
Step 4: Let F be the Fq-subspace of Fqm generated by the coordinates of c”.
Find the codeword c in C⊥ of rank weight w whose support is F (meaning that
the Fq-subspace generated by its coordinates should belong to F .)
What justifies the third step is the fact that Proposition 5.10 generalizes
easily to the projected code, whereas what justifies Step 4 is the fact that it is
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extremely likely that c” is the projection of a codeword in C⊥ of weight d we
are looking for. We recover in this case such a codeword by the process of Step
4. The complexity of this attack is dominated by the third step and is given by
Theorem 4.6.
In [11], some parameters for the LRPC cryptosystem are suggested. They
are recalled in the following table
n k m q d security
74 37 41 2 4 80
94 47 47 2 5 128
68 34 23 24 4 100
In each case the factorization of Xk − 1 in Fq[X ] is given by
(i) X37 − 1 = (X − 1)
∑36
i=0X
i
(ii) X47 − 1 = (X − 1)PQ with degP = degQ = 23
(iii) X34 − 1 = (X − 1)2(P1 . . . P8)
2 with degPi = 2, for all i ∈ J1; 8K.
In the first case, the polynomialX37−1 has only two divisors, so we can only
use the first attack. In the second case, we can choose D = P or Q to obtain a
folded code of dimension 23. According to Theorem 4.6, the complexity of the
attack is O
(
23347323×22)
)
≈ 296.2, that is a gain around 232 compared to the
best attack considered in [11] and about 220 compared to the best attack found
in [17, Subsec. 3.2].
The third case is the most interesting. Here we can freely choose the dimen-
sion of the projected code. Keep in mind that we want the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound greater than d which is the case when the dimension k” of the projected
code is > 4. We choose k” = 4 and we have in this case an attack of complexity
243.6 which clearly leads to a feasible attack.
In [13], a new set of parameters is proposed, as follows :
n k m q d security
82 41 41 2 5 80
106 53 53 2 6 128
74 37 23 24 4 100
In each case the factorization of Xk − 1 in Fq[X ] is given by
(i) X41 − 1 = (X − 1)PQ with degP = degQ = 20
(ii) X53 − 1 = (X − 1)
52∑
i=0
X i
(iii) X37 − 1 = (X − 1)P1 . . . P4 with degPi = 9, for all i ∈ J1; 4K.
The first case allow a non-trivial projection but it is not sufficient to obtain
a better complexity than 80. In the second case, we can only use the folding
attack, and its complexity is greater than 128.
In the third case, we can choose a projected code of dimension 9 and we
have an attack of complexity 287,1, that is a gain around 213.
As we can see, it is crucial to choose k such that Xk − 1 has the minimum
of factors in Fq[X ], it can always be factorisable in (X − 1)(
k−1∑
i=0
X i) so one have
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to choose
k−1∑
i=0
X i irreducible in Fq. This implies k prime but it is not sufficient,
as the third case of the parameters proposed in [13] proves it.
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